Abstract-Proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain protocols are emerging as one of the most promising alternatives to the energy-consuming proof-of-work protocols. However, one particularly critical threat in the PoS setting is the well-known long-range attacks caused by secret key leakage (LRSL attack). Specifically, an adversary can attempt to compromise accounts possessing substantial stake at some past moment such that alter the chain history, violating the fundamental persistence property. Puncturable signatures, introduced by Bellare et al. (Eurocrypt'16), provide a satisfying solution to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain resilient to the LRSL attack. In this paper, we provide an in-depth study of puncturable signatures and explore its applications in the proof-of-stake blockchain. We formalize a security model that allows the adversary for adaptive signing and puncturing queries, and show a construction with efficient puncturing operations based on the Bloom filter data structure and strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, we use the puncturable signatures to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocols to resist the LRSL attack, while previously the forward-secure signature (FS) is used to immunize this attack. We implement our scheme and provide experimental results showing that in comparison with FS our construction performs substantially better on signature size, signing and verification efficiency, significantly on key update efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols have been heralded as a more ecological way to come to consensus on blockchain since it does not rely on expensive hardware using vast amounts of electricity to compute mathematical puzzles as bitcoin's proof-of-work mechanism. In a proof-of-stake blockchain protocol, roughly speaking, participants randomly elect one party to produce the next block by running a "leader election" process with probability proportional to their current stake (a virtual resource) held on blockchain.
In spite of high efficiency, proof-of-stake blockchains only account for a tiny percentage of existing digital currencies market, mainly due to the fact that most existing proof-of-stake protocols suffer from the well-known longrange attacks [1] [2] [3] (stemming from its weak subjectivity and costless simulation) which degrades security in the blockchain. A oft-cited long-range attack is caused by secret key leakage (abbreviated as LRSL attack in this paper). Specifically, an adversary can attempt to bribe (or corrupt) the secret keys corresponding to accounts that have low or no stake currently but possessed substantial stake at some past moment, and then construct a fork and alter the history from the point in the past with (past) majority stake. Note that the accounts with small or (even zero) stake are highly susceptible to secret key leakage since they might not be protected as other active accounts which further facilitates this attack.
• X.-Y. Li Puncturable signature (PS), introduced by Bellare et al. [4] , provides a satisfying solution to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocols resilient to LRSL attack. Loosely speaking, a puncturable signature scheme provides a Puncture functionality that, given a secret key and a message m, produces an updated secret key that is able to sign all messages except for the punctured message m. In this paper, we further generalize the definition of the puncturable signature, particularly, the strings associated with the punctured signing key can be any part of signed messages (e.g. its prefix). In proof-of-stake protocols, the leader U (elected for issuing block) signs the block B i with the puncturable signature by the secret key sk U at some time slot sl i , where sl i is the part of block B i , and then U performs puncturing operation on message sl i which results in an updated sk ′ U . More specifically, if no empty block is allowed, the punctured message can be H(B i−1 ) instead of sl i , where H(B i−1 ) is the part of block B i and B i−1 is the previous block of B i . The security of puncturable signature guarantees that anyone cannot sign another data block B ′ i with the same sl i (or H(B i−1 )) even though sk ′ U is exposed, and thus LRSL attack can be avoided.
A natural way to remedy the LRSL attack in proofof-stake blockchain protocols is to use the forward secure signature [5] , which preserves the validity of past signatures even if the current secret key is compromised. However, the computation performance of the forward secure signature depends on either the time periods set in advance or the time periods elapsed so far logarithmically (even linearly), which brings undesirable consumption and becomes a fatal issue for blockchain applications. Moreover, most signers have no chance to do any signing within one period but they have to update the signing key as long as the current period ends, which makes the update operation a vain effort in the proof-of-stake blockchain. In fact, the forward secure signature can be treated as one special kind of the puncturable signature where the punctured message is the earlier period of time.
Puncturable signatures can also be used in many other scenarios such as asynchronous transaction data signing services. Transaction data signing is a process which guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the sensitive transaction data, such as payment instruction or transaction information of buying a real estate offering. In many cases, using ordinary digital signatures is not enough for these application, as they often fail to ensure the integrity of past messages in the case when a user's key is compromised. This is particularly challenging in the non-interactive and asynchronous message system, where users may not be online simultaneously and messages may be delayed for substantial periods due to delivery failures and connectivity issues. Similar problem also exists in the theoretical part. For instance, in non-interactive multiparty computation (NI-MPC) [6] , where a group of completely asynchronous parties can evaluate a function (e.g. for the purpose of voting) over their joint inputs by sending a signed message to an evaluator who computes the output. The adversary would control the final output if he can corrupt some parties within a period of time. In these examples, the transaction session ID can be used as a prefix, and after the honest user signs the transaction data (or message), the prefix is punctured so that no other signature exists for messages agreeing on the same prefix. Therefore, the integrity of transaction data (or message) is ensured by puncturable signatures.
Our Contributions
In this work, we provide an in-depth study of the puncturable signature and its applications in the proof-of-stake blockchain protocols. Our overall goal is to design a puncturable signature that allows for fine-grained revocation of signing capability with minimum computation cost, and make it a suitable building block to construct secure and practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. More specifically, our technical contributions are as follows.
Puncturable signature and its construction. We introduce the notion of puncturable signature with extended puncturing functionality where the secret key can be updated by puncturing any particular part of message (for simplicity, we use the prefix of message in this paper) instead of puncturing the whole message. In the security model we propose, in addition to making adaptive signing and puncturing queries, adversary also has (one-time) oracle access to a featured Corruption oracle, by which the adversary can obtain the current secret key if the challenging string is in the puncturing set P . Then we show a construction of puncturable signature based on the probabilistic Bloom filter data structure [7] that is secure under our security model. Our PS construction is inspired by an elegant work [8] , where the authors show how to construct puncturable encryption based on Bloom filter. However, different from the expanded (k times) ciphertext size of underlying encryption scheme in [8] , in our construction, the signature size is almost equal to that of the underlying signature scheme.
In comparison with two prior puncturable signature schemes [4] [6], our construction achieves significant efficiency improvement in both signing and puncturing operations. More specifically, the construction in [4] relies on indistinguishability obfuscation, which incurs prohibitive computational burden in practice, while the other one [6] needs update public key for every puncturing, which has some theoretical merits but hard to implement in real world deployment. On the contrary, in our construction, a puncturing operation only involves a small number of efficient computations (i.e. hashing), plus the deletion of certain parts of the secret key, which outperforms previous schemes by orders of magnitude. Indeed, the puncturable signature is not a simple inverse operation of the puncturable encryption, which is also the reason for no efficient puncturable signature scheme even though efficient puncturable encryption constructions have been proposed for a long time. The crucial difficulty in designing the puncturable signature scheme is how to bind the private key with punctured messages such that the updated private key cannot sign for punctured messages.
Applications in Proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. We use puncturable signature to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocols that are resilient to the LRSL attack. Ouroboros Paros [9] , a proof-of-stake blockchain protocol, has a real-world implementation in Cardano platform. We present an ideal functionality F PS of the puncturable signature scheme, and replace F KES of the forward secure signature scheme in Ouroboros Paros [9] protocol with F PS . Then we show that the properties (common prefix, chain quality and chain growth) of Ouroboros Paros protocol remain true in the replaced setting. However, most of the existing forward secure signatures have poor performance on key update as well as other operations, often depending on the time period number linearly, which is unsuitable for blockchain application. We conduct experiments evaluating the overhead of deploying our puncturable signature construction and existing forward security signature schemes [10] [11] at both 128-bit and 192-bit security levels. Figure  1 illustrates the efficiency comparison and the results show that our scheme performs substantially better on signature size, signing and verification efficiency, significantly on key update efficiency, which reduces both communication and computation complexity. In fact, we can replace the ordinary signature with our puncturable signature construction in any other proof-of-stake protocols such as Ouroboros [12] and Snow White [13] protocols. Due to the fact that our construction can retain the efficiency of the underlying scheme on signing and verifying, with additional k hash computations, the improved protocols can provide resilience to the LRSL attack at almost no additional computing cost.
Related Work
Puncturable signature. A puncturable signature scheme allows to update its signing key sk for an arbitrary message m such that the resulting punctured signing key can produce signatures for all messages except for m. It is introduced by Bellare et al. [4] as a tool to prove a negative results on differing-inputs obfuscation. However, their construction is based on indistinguishability obfuscation [14] and one-way function, thus, do not yield practical schemes. Moreover, it requires that the punctured signing key is associated with the full signed message. In contrast our construction is based on the τ -SDH assumption, and the string associated with the punctured signing key can be any particular part of the message to be signed (e.g. the prefix of the message), which is more flexible and applicable. Halevi et al. [6] also propose a puncturable signature scheme which is puncturable at any prefix of the signed message. However, their puncturable operation needs to update public keys repeatedly. In practice, it is inefficient to verify the updated public keys continuously and it is also difficult to let each user in the system maintain other users' public keys updated.
Delegatable Signature. Policy-based signature, introduced by Bellare et al. [15] , allows a signer to only sign messages conforming to some authority-specified policy. It elegantly unifies existing work, capturing other forms of signatures as special cases. Puncturable signature differs from this work, as the secret key is updated adaptively with respect to the message prefix. Another related primitive, called functional signature is introduced in work [16] . In the functional signature, in addition to a master signing key that can be used to sign any message, there are signing keys for a function f , which allow one to sign any message in the range of f . Delegatable functional signature is introduced in work [17] and supports the delegation of signing capabilities to another party, called the evaluator, with respect to a functionality. Append-only signatures (AOS) [18] is also a related primitive, in particular, any party given an AOS signature on a message m = M 1 ||...||M n can compute an AOS signature on any message m = M 1 ||...||M n ||M n+1 . Different from above primitives, puncturable signature provides a puncture functionality that may repeatedly update the secret key to revoke signing capability for selected messages besides providing delegation function.
Forward secure signature. A forward secure signature scheme guarantees the adversary with the compromised secret key at some point in time cannot forge signatures relative to previous time periods. It is introduced by Anderson [19] and formalized by Bellare et al. [5] . The constructions of prior forward secure signatures are divided into two categories: using arbitrary signature schemes in a black box manner [11] [20] , and modifying specific signature schemes [5] [10] [21] . All these forward secure schemes except for [11] , the number of time periods T (arbitrarily large) must be set in advance, such that the performance depends on T logarithmically or even linearly. Nevertheless, the performance in [11] still depends on the time periods elapsed so far.
Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols. Proof-of-stake protocols were first initiated in online forums and subsequently a number of proof-of-stake protocols were proposed and implemented by the academic community. In order to provide forward security (and also achieve resilience against the LRSL attack and other long-range attacks), Ouroboros Paros [9] and Ouroboros Genesis [22] formalize and realize in the universal composition setting a forward secure digital signature scheme, Algorand [23] considers it as one of future work and implements ephemeral key pairs in its updated full version [24] , whereas Snow White [13] and Ouroboros [12] adopt a weak adaptive corruption model and cannot avoid LRSL attack. In addition, several countermeasures have been proposed, such as punishment by revealing the real identity [1] , revealing the signing key [25] or slashing the stake [26] of the malicious stakeholder, the trusted execution environments [1] , and checkpointing mechanism [27] .
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Let λ denote the security parameter, ⌊x⌋ denote the greatest integer less than or equal to x, [n] denote the set of the first n positive integers, and PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time. For an array T ∈ {0, 1} n , we let T [i] denote the i-th bit of the array, if i ≤ n.
We say a function negl(·) : N → (0, 1) is negligible, if for every constant c ∈ N, negl(n) < n −c for sufficiently large n.
Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter [7] is a probabilistic data structure for the approximate set membership problem. It allows a succinct representation T of a set S of elements from a large universe U, where the price for succinctness is allowing errors. Put simply, for any s ∈ S the Bloom filter always outputs 1 ("yes"), and for any s / ∈ S it outputs 1 only with small probability (called the false-positive errors).
Definition 1 (Bloom Filter [8] ). A Bloom filter BF for set U consists of algorithms (Gen, Update, Check), which are defined as follows.
• Gen(ℓ, k): On input two integers ℓ, k ∈ N, the algorithm first samples k universal hash functions H 1 , . . . , H k , where
and T = 0 ℓ (T is an ℓ-bit array with all bits set to 0). Output (H, T ).
• Update(H, T, u):
ℓ , and u ∈ U, the algorithm defines the updated state T ′ by first assigning
, and returns T ′ .
• Check(H, T, u):
, T ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , and u ∈ U, the algorithm returns a bit
Properties of Bloom filter. The properties of Bloom filter relevant to our work can be summarized as follows:
Perfect completeness: A Bloom filter always outputs 1 for elements that have already been added to the set S. More precisely, let S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } ∈ U n be any vector of n elements of U.
Compact representation of set S: The size of representation T is a constant number of ℓ bits, and independent of the size of set S and the representation of individual elements of U. The increase in size of set S only increases the false-positive probability, but not the size of representation T .
Bounded false-positive errors: Given the size of set S, the probability that an element which has not yet been added to the Bloom filter is erroneously "recognized" as being in the filter can be made arbitrarily small, by choosing ℓ and k accordingly. More precisely, let S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } ∈ U n be any vector of n elements of U, for any s * ∈ U − S, we have
, and the probability is taken over the random coins of algorithm Gen(ℓ, k).
Discussion on the choice of parameters. In bloom filter, assuming the optimal number of hash function k to achieve the smallest false-positive probability pr, we obtain a size of the bloom filter given by ℓ = − n ln pr (ln 2) 2 , and the optimal k is given by k = ⌈ ℓ n ln 2⌉. For example, when pr = 10 −3 and n = 2 20 , we have ℓ ≈ 2 MB and k = 10.
Bilinear Groups
We say that G is a bilinear group generator if given the security parameter λ, it outputs a tuple params = (p, e, ψ, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ), where G 1 , G 2 and G T are three groups have prime order p, P i is the generator of G i for i ∈ {1, 2}, and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a non-degenerate map satisfying:
• Bilinearity: For any (P, Q) ∈ G 1 × G 2 and a, b ∈ Z * p , we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
• Non-degeneracy: For any P ∈ G 1 , e(P, Q) = 1 for any Q ∈ G 2 iff S = O.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any (P, Q) ∈ G 1 × G 2 .
• There exists an efficiently, publicly computable isomorphism ψ :
The security of our scheme is based on the τ -strong Diffie-Hellman (τ -SDH) assumption, which was previously formalized in [28] and [29] .
, and let (P 1 , P 2 , αP 2 ,α 2 P 2 ,...,α τ P 2 ) be a τ + 2 tuple for α ∈ Z * p . We say τ -SDH assumption holds if for any PPT 
PUNCTURABLE SIGNATURES
In this section, we formalize the syntax and security definition of puncturable signature, and then we propose a puncturable signature scheme and prove its security under the τ -SDH assumption.
Syntax and Security Definition
Let the message space be M. A puncturable signature scheme Σ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms Σ = (Setup, Puncture, Sign, Verify) with descriptions as follows:
• Setup(1 λ , ℓ, k): On input the security parameter λ, parameters ℓ and k for the Bloom filter, the setup algorithm outputs the public key vk as well as the secret key sk.
• Puncture(sk, str): On input the secret key sk and a string str ∈ M, the puncturing algorithm outputs the updated secret key sk ′ which is also called the punctured secret key. We also say that str has been punctured.
• Sign(sk, m): On input the secret key sk and a message m, it outputs a signature σ.
• Verify(vk, m, σ): On input the public key vk, a signature σ and message m, the verification algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature for m. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Correctness of puncturable signatures. Intuitively, the correctness requires that (1) signing is always successful with the initial, non-punctured secret key, (2) signing fails when attempting to sign a message with a prefix that has been punctured, and (3) the probability that signing fails is bounded by some non-negligible function, if the prefix of the message to be signed has not been punctured. we still use prefix-puncturing through this paper, but both the definitions and our constructions can be easily extended to support the general puncturing functionality.
Definition 3 (Correctness
Security Definition. For the security definition of the puncturable signature scheme Σ, we use the following experiment to describe it. Intuitively, the security definition of Σ requires that the adversary cannot forge signatures on messages having been punctured even though the punctured secret key is compromised. Formally, for any PPT adversary A, we consider the experiment Expt ps A (1 λ ) between A and the challenger C: 1) Setup: C computes (vk, sk) ← Setup(1 λ ) and sends vk to adversary A. The C initializes two empty sets Q sig = ∅ and P = ∅. 2) Query Phase: Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can submit the following two kinds of queries:
• Signature query: On input message m from the adversary A, C computes σ ← Sign(sk, m) and updates Q sig = Q sig ∪ {m}. Then C sends back σ.
• Puncture query: On input a string str, C updates sk by running Puncture(sk, str), and updates P =P ∪ {str}. 3) Challenge Phase: A sends the challenge puncture string m ′ to challenger, and A can still submit signature and puncture queries as described in the Query phase.
4) Corruption query:
The challenger returns sk if m ′ ∈ P and ⊥ otherwise. 5) Forgery: A outputs a forgery pair (m, σ).
We say that adversary A wins the experiment Expt
Definition 4 (Unforgeability with adaptive puncturing). We say the puncturable signature scheme Σ is unforgeable with adaptive puncturing, if for any PPT adversary A, the probability of winning experiment Expt
, where the probability is over the randomness of the challenger and adversary.
Our Construction
We present a puncturable signature construction based on the Chinese IBS, an identity-based signature scheme standardized in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [30] .
The key idea of our construction is to derive secret keys for all Bloom filter bits i ∈ [l] using IBS schemes, and then bind the prefix string m ′ with k positions where the secret keys are used to sign messages with prefix m ′ . In addition, puncturing at m ′ implies the deletion of keys in the corresponding positions.
Let (p, e, ψ,
, and BF = (BF.Gen, BF.Update, BF.Check) be a Bloom filter. Choose a random generator P 2 ∈ G 2 , and set
p be cryptographic hash functions, which we model as random oracles in the security proof. The public parameters are params := (p, e, ψ, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 , h 1 , h 2 ) and all the algorithms described below implicitly take params as input. The construction of the puncturable signature scheme Σ = (Setup, Puncture, Sign, Verify) is the following:
where sk i = s s+h1(i) P 1 , P pub = sP 2 , and g = e(P 1 , P pub ).
• Puncture(sk, str): Given a secret key sk = (T,
where
) and a message m with the prefix m ′ , the algorithm first checks whether
The output signature on m is σ = (h, S, i j * ).
• Verify(vk, m, σ): Given the public key vk
), a message m with the prefix m ′ , and a signature σ = (h, S, i j * ), the algorithm checks whether
If it holds, the algorithm outputs 1, and 0 otherwise. Lemma 3.1. Our basic construction described above satisfies correctness (c.f. Definition 3).
Proof. If the secret key is initial and non-punctured, we have
and then h = h 2 m, r) = h 2 (m, e(S, h 1 (i j * )P 2 + P pub )g h . Therefore, the first requirement of Definition 3 holds. If m ′ is punctured, by the perfect completeness of Bloom filter, we have BF.Check(H, T, m ′ ) = 1, which means all the secret keys used to sign messages with m ′ as the prefix have been deleted. Therefore, the signing of the message m with the prefix m ′ fails and the second requirement of Definition 3 holds. If m ′ is not punctured, the correctness error of our construction occurs only when BF.Check(H, T, m ′ ) = 1, which is essentially identical to the false-positive probability of the Bloom filter and the third requirement of Definition 3 holds.
Remark 2.
In this section, we assume that the false-positive probability from Bloom filter is acceptable, which means the number of puncturings supported by our construction is below a pre-set parameter, depending on the application scenarios and also the upper bound n of the Bloom filter. In the security proof below, we also assume that the number of puncturing queries is also bounded by the pre-set parameter.
Theorem 1. Assuming that an algorithm A wins in the Expt
k ) within a running time t 0 , then the τ -SDH assumption can be broken for τ = q h1 within a running time t 2 ≤ 120686q h2 t 0 /(ǫ 0 (1 − τ /p)), where q h1 , q h2 and q S are the maximum query times of the hash function h 1 , h 2 and signing respectively.
Proof. In order to prove the security of our scheme, we consider a particular adversary B with a fixed position against our signature scheme in a variant of the above experiment Expt 
Lemma 3.2. Assuming that an algorithm A wins in the Expt
f. Definition 4) to our construction ps, with a probability ǫ 0 within a running time t 0 , then there exists an algorithm B that wins in the Expt fps A (1 λ ) experiment as described above to ps which has a probability
Proof. Suppose there exists such an adversary A, and we construct a simulator B that simulates an attack environment and uses A's forgery to win in its own Expt fps A (1 λ ) experiment. The simulator B can be described as follows:
• Invocation. B is invoked on a given position i * ∈ [l].
• Queries. B answers adaptive queries from A as follows: -B makes the Setup query and forwards all the returned parameters to A for A's Setup query. -Before A outputs the challenge string, B just forwards the queries of A, including Sign, Puncture, h 1 and h 2 , to its experiment and returns the result to A. -When A outputs the challenge string denoted by m ′ after the series of queries, B checks whether i * ∈ {H j (m ′ ) : j ∈ [k]} and aborts if this does not hold. Otherwise, B provides the simulation for A as follows. For the queries h 1 , h 2 , Puncture and Sign, B just passes them to its challenger and returns the result as before. While for Corruption query, B firstly checks whether m ′ ∈ P and returns ∅ if this does not hold. Otherwise, B makes Corruption query in its experiment, and returns the response sk to A.
Eventually, A outputs a valid signature (m, σ = (h, S, j * )), where m ′ is the prefix of m. If j * = i * , then B sets (m, σ) as its own output and apparently B also wins in its Expt fps A (1 λ ) experiment. In the simulation described above, there are two events that cause B to abort:
} for the challenge string m * ; (2) i * = j * for the forged signature σ = (h, S, j * ). Recall that the k hash functions in Bloom filter are sampled universally and independently, and thus each position in the array is selected with an equal probability. Besides, i * is invisible and looks random to A, then the selection of m ′ is independent of i * . Therefore the probability that
Similarly, the second event i * = j * happens with probability 1 − 1/k. Combing these, with probability (1 λ ) experiment to our construction ps, with an advantage ǫ 1 ≥ 10(q S + 1)(q S + q h2 )/p within a running time t 1 , then there exists an algorithm C that breaks the τ -SDH assumption for τ = q h1 within a running time t 2 ≤ 120686q h2 t 1 /(ǫ 1 (1 − τ /p)), where q h1 , q h2 and q S are the maximum query times of the hash function h 1 , h 2 and signing respectively.
Proof. Suppose there exists such an adversary B, and we construct a simulator C that simulates an attack environment and uses B's forgery to break the τ -SDH assumption. The simulator C can be described as follows:
• Invocation. C takes as input a random instance (P 1 , P 2 , αP 2 , α 2 P 2 ,...,α τ P 2 ) and aims to find a pair (h,
) will be used as the response to B's h 1 queries. C expands the polynomial
to be new generators of G 2 and G 1 . Then the master public key is set toP pub = τ i=1 c i−1 (α i P 2 ) such thatP pub = αP 2 , thus the master secret key is the unknown α.
To provide the secret keys corresponding to positions having been queried to
Thus, the τ − 1 pairs (w i , α α+wiP 1 ) can be computed using the left member of equation (1).
Then C provides the parameters (p, e, ψ,
In addition, C also generates a Bloom filter as ({H j } j∈ [k] , T ) ← BF.Gen(ℓ, k), then outputs the verification key vk = (P pub , g, {H j } j∈ [k] ) (now g = e(P 1 ,P pub )) and challenge position i * to B. Then C is ready to answer B's queries during the simulation. For simplicity, we may assume as in [32] that for any i ∈ [l], B queries h 1 (i) at most once and any query involving i is proceeded by the RO query h 1 (i), which means that B has to query h 1 (i) before he can obtain a signature (h, S, i) from Signature query and obtain the secret key sk i from Corruption query by using a simple wrapper of B.
• Hash function queries. C initializes a counter t to 1.
Otherwise, C returns w = w t and increments t. In both cases, C stores (i, w) in a list
) is in the list L 2 (initialized to be empty). Otherwise, it outputs a random element h and stores (m, r, h) in L 2 . Note that, according to the query of h 1 and the computation in the setup phase, C knows the secret key sk i = α α+wiP 1 for i = i * .
• Query Phase. C answers adaptive signing and puncturing queries from B as follows:
-Signature query: On input a message m with prefix m ′ , C first checks BF.Check({H j } j∈[k] , T, m ′ ) = 1 and outputs ⊥ in this case. Otherwise, there exists at least one index i j ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i k } such that sk ij = ⊥,
p , computes and sets r = e(S, h 1 (j)P 2 +P pub ).e(P 1 ,P pub ) h , and backpatches to define h 2 (m, r) = h. Finally, C stores (m, r, h) in L 2 , and returns the signature σ = (h, S, j) (C aborts in the unlikely collision event that h 2 (m, r) is already defined by other query results of Sign or h 2 , the probability of which is negligible since r is random [33] ). -Puncture query: On input a string str, C first updates
The updated signing key is sk
• Corruption query: For Corruption query, C recovers the matching pair (i, w) from L 1 and returns the previously computed α α+wP 1 .
• Forgery. If adversary B forges a valid tuple (m, r, h, S, i * ) in a time t 1 with probability ǫ 1 ≥ 10(q S + 1)(q S + q h2 )/p, where the message m has prefix m ′ , according to the forking lemma [33] , C can replay adversary B with different choices of random elements for hash function h 2 and obtain two valid tuples (m, r, h ′ , S 1 , i * ) and (m, r, h ′′ , S 2 , i * ), with h ′ =h ′′ in expected time t 2 ≤120686q h2 t 1 /ǫ 1 . Now a standard argument for outputs of the forking lemma can be applied as follows: C recovers the pair (i * , w * ) from L 1 , and note that w * = w 1 , ..., w τ −1 with probability at least 1 − τ /p. Since both forgeries satisfies the verification equation, we can obtain the following relations:
and hence
w * +α P 1 . From T * , C can proceed as in [28] to extract σ * = 1 w * +α P 1 : C first writes the polynomial f as f (y) = γ(y)(y + w * ) + γ −1 for some polynomial γ(y) = τ −2 i=0 γ i y i and some γ −1 ∈ Z * p by using long division method, and eventually computes
and returns (w * , σ * ) as the solution to the τ -SDH instance.
The combination of the above lemmas yields Theorem 1.
PUNCTURABLE SIGNATURE IN PROOF-OF-STAKE BLOCKCHAIN
Before describing the application of the puncturable signature scheme in proof-of-stake blockchain, we recall some basic definitions [9] [12] of proof-of-stake blockchain and secure properties [34] [35] of blockchain. We assume that there are n stakeholders U 1 , . . . , U n and each stakeholder U i possesses s i stake and a public and secret key pair (vk i , sk i ). Without loss of generality, we assume that the public keys vk 1 , . . . , vk n are known by all system users. The protocol execution is divided in time units, called slots. s 1 ) , . . . , (vk n , s n ) and auxiliary information ρ.
Definition 6 (State, Block Proof, Block, Blockchain, Epoch). A state is a string st ∈ {0, 1} λ . A block proof is a set of values B π containing information that allows stakeholders to verify whether a block is valid. A block B = (sl j , st, d, B π,j , σ j ) 1 generated at a slot sl j ∈ {sl 1 , · · · , sl R } contains the slot number sl j , the current state st ∈ {0, 1} λ , data d ∈ {0, 1} * , a block proof B π,j , and σ j , a signature on (sl j , st, d, B π,j ) computed under the signing key for sl j of the stakeholder U i generating the block.
A blockchain relative to the genesis block B 0 is a sequence of blocks B 1 , · · · , B n associated with a strictly increasing sequence of slots for which the state st i of B i is equal to H(B i−1 ), where H is a prescribed collisionresistent hash function. The length of a chain len(C) = n is its number of blocks. The block B n is the head of the chain, denoted head(C). We treat the empty string ε as a legal chain and by convention set head(ε) = ε.
An epoch is a set of R adjacent slots S = {sl 1 , ..., sl R }, during which the stake distribution for selecting slot leaders remains unchanged.
Definition 7 (Properties of Blockchain
• Common Prefix. The chains C 1 and C 2 possessed by two honest parties at the onset of the slots sl 1 < sl 2 are such that C ⌈k 1 C 2 , where C ⌈k 1 denotes the chain obtained by removing the last k blocks from C 1 and denotes the prefix relation.
• Chain Quality. Consider any portion of length at least k of the chain possessed by an honest party at the onset of a round; the ratio of blocks originating from the adversary is at most 1 − µ. We call µ the chain quality coefficient.
• Chain Growth. Consider the chains C 1 and C 2 possessed by two honest parties at the onset of two slots sl 1 , sl 2 with sl 2 at least s slots ahead of sl 1 . Then it holds that len(C 2 ) − len(C 1 ) ≥ τ · s. We call τ the speed coefficient.
Application in Ouroboros Paros Protocol
Ouroboros Praos [9] , a proof-of-stake protocol, provides security against fully-adaptive corruption in the semisynchronous setting, where the adversary can corrupt any stakeholders adaptively under the honest majority of stake assumption and an adversary-controlled message delivery delay unknown to the honest stakeholders is tolerated. Their security analysis adopts the universal composability framework. The adversary can control transactions and blocks generated by corrupted parties by interacting with functionalities F DSIG , F KES and F VRF , where transactions are signed with a regular EUF-CMA secure signature scheme modelled by F DSIG , blocks are signed with key-evolving signature scheme with forward security modelled by F KES , and the leader selection process is executed locally using a special verifiable random function (VRF) modelled by F VRF . The basic protocol for the static stake case denoted by F SPoS is constructed in the F INIT -hybrid model, where the genesis stake distribution S 0 and the nonce η used in F VRF are determined by the ideal functionality F INIT . It is proved F SPoS can achieve common prefix, chain growth and chain quality by using the natural bookkeeping tool "forks" as in [12] , and results remain true when F DSIG , F KES and F VRF are replaced by their real-word implementations in the socalled real experiment. Finally, the protocol is extended to the dynamic case where the stake distribution changes over time. All the functionalities we mentioned above are defined in Appendix C.
The puncturable signature can resist LRSL attack due to the fact that the leader U in slot sl j would update the secret signing key sk after the block is proposed, and with the updated signing key the adversary cannot forge a signature at sl j in the name of U and thus cannot re-write a new block at the position sl j . Also note that as in [9] , we also assume in this paper that honest stakeholders can do secure erasures, which is argued to be a reasonable assumption when capturing protocol security against adaptive adversaries [36] .
We now present an ideal functionality F PS of puncturable signature scheme, and show any property of the protocol that we prove true in the hybrid experiment (including common prefix, chain quality and chain growth) will remain true in the setting F KES is replaced by F PS . The revised static proof-of-stake protocol π ′ SPoS is described in Appendix A. In addition, we show that F PS can be realized by basic puncturable signature construction in Section 3.2.
In a high level, the ideal functionality F PS (as defined in Figure 2 ) allows an adversary that corrupts the signer to forge signatures only for messages with the unpunctured prefix. Our starting point for F PS is the standard digital signature functionality defined in [37] with the difference that the signing operation is packed together with a puncture operation and the signature verification operation lets the adversary set the response only for the signature of the unpunctured messages.
Theorem 2.
The improved proof-of-stake blockchain protocol π ′ SPoS described in Appendix A still satisfies common prefix, chain quality and chain growth if F KES is replaced by F PS .
We present the full proof in Appendix B. The strategy of our proof is: given the event of violating one of common prefix, chain quality and chain growth in an execution of π ′ SPoS with access to F PS by adversary A and environment Z, we can construct another adversary A ′ so that the corresponding event happens with the same probability in an execution of π SPoS with access to F KES (c.f. Appendix C.3) by adversary A ′ and environment Z, where π SPoS is original protocol [9] . If the environment Z can distinguish a real execution with A and π ′ SPoS (accessing F PS ) from an ideal execution, then Z can also distinguish a real execution with A ′ and π SPoS (accessing F KES ) from an ideal execution.
Remark 3.
The dynamic stake case can be extended as in [9] .
Specifically, F INIT is replaced with a "resettable" variant to capture the grinding capabilities of the adversary by permitting him/her to select one from a family of r independent and uniformly random nonces, a resettable leaky beacon functionality is introduced such that provides a fresh nonce for each epoch to accommodate dynamic stake, and other sub-functionalities remain unchanged.
Realizing F PS . Following the proof strategy of [37] , in this section we will show how to translate a puncturable signature scheme Σ into a signature protocol π Σ in the present setting and then prove that π Σ can securely realize F PS . Specifically, π Σ protocol runs between a stakeholder U S and other stakeholders U 1 , ..., U n and proceeds based on a puncturable signature scheme Σ=(Setup, Puncture, Sign, Verify) as follows: 1) Key Generation: When U S , running π Σ , receives an input (KeyGen, sid, U S ), it verifies whether sid = (U S , sid ′ ) for some sid ′ . If not, it ignores the input. Otherwise, it runs Setup(1 λ ), records the signing key (sid, U S , sk) and sets P = ∅, and outputs (VefificationKey, sid, vk).
2) Sign and Puncture: When U S receives an input (PSign, sid, U S , m = m ′ ...) for an sid which it owns the signing key (sid, U S , sk), it checks whether m ′ ∈ P . If not, U S runs Sign(sk, m) to obtain σ, runs Puncture(sk, m ′ ) to update the secret keys, sets P = P ∪ m ′ and outputs (Signature, sid, m, σ). 3) Verify: When a stakeholder U i (i ∈ [n]) receives an input (Verify, sid, m, σ, vk ′ ), it outputs (Verified, sid, m, Verify(vk ′ , m, σ)).
Functionality F PS
F PS interacts with a signer U S and stakeholder U i as follows: Key Generation. Upon receiving a message (KeyGen, sid, U S ) from a stakeholder U S , verify that sid = (U S , sid ′ ) for some sid ′ . If not, then ignore the request. Else, send (KeyGen, sid, U S ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (PublicKey, sid, U S , v) from the adversary, send (PublicKey, sid, v) to U S , record the entry (sid, U S , v), and set P = ∅. Sign and Puncture. Upon receiving a message (PSign, sid, U S , m = m ′ ...) from U S , verify that (sid, U S , v) is recorded for some sid and that m ′ / ∈ P . If not, then ignore the request. Else, send (Sign, sid, U S , m) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Signature, sid, U S , m, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry (m, σ, v, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to U S and halt. Else, send (Signature, sid, m, σ) to U S , record the entry (m, σ, v, 1), and set P = P ∪ {m ′ }. Signature Verification. Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, m = m ′ ..., σ, v ′ ) from some stakeholder U i do: Proof. Assume that π Σ does not realize F PS , i.e. there exists an environment Z that can tell whether it is interacting with a prescribed simulator S and F PS , or with an adversary A and π Σ . Then following the proof approach of [37] we can show Z can be used to construct a forger G that wins with non-negligible probability in the experiment Expt ps G (1 λ ) for the underlying puncturable signature scheme Σ as defined in Definition 4, which in turn violates the unforgeability with adaptive puncturing of Σ. Since Z can succeed for any simulator S, it also succeeds for the following specific S, where S runs a simulated copy of A: 1) Any input from Z is forwarded to A, and any outputs from A is returned to Z. 2) Whenever S receives (KeyGen, sid, U S ) from F PS , it proceeds as follows: if sid is not of the form (U S , sid ′ ), then S ignores this request. Otherwise, S runs Setup(1 λ ), records the signing key (sid, U S , sk), sets P = ∅, and outputs (VefificationKey, sid, vk) to F PS . 3) Whenever S receives (PSign, sid, U S , m = m ′ ...) from F PS , if there is a recorded signing key (sid, U S , sk) and m ′ / ∈ P , S runs Sign(sk, m) to obtain σ, runs Puncture(sk, m ′ ) to obtain the update secret keys, sets P = P ∪ {m ′ } and outputs (Signature, sid, m, σ) to F PS . Otherwise, it ignores the request. 4) Whenever S receives (Verify, sid, m, σ, vk ′ ) from F PS , it returns (Verified, sid, m, Verify(vk ′ , m, σ)) to F PS .
5) When
A corrupts a party U i , S corrupts U i in the ideal world. If U i is the signer U S , S reveals the current signing keys sk and the internal state of algorithm Sign (if there exists) as the internal state of U i . Recall that Z can distinguish an ideal execution with S and F PS from a real execution with A and π Σ , then we would demonstrate that the underlying Σ is forgeable by constructing a forger G as follows. G runs a simulated instance of Z, and simulates for Z an interaction with S and F PS where G plays the role of both S and F PS . Moreover, in the simulating process, like S, G will also run a simulated run of A.
When Z activates some party U S with input (KeyGen, sid, U S ), G returns the public key vk from its experiment to Z. When Z activates U S with input (Sign, sid, U S , m = m ′ ...), G calls its signing oracle with m to obtain a signature σ, calls its puncture oracle with m ′ to update the secret keys, then updates the puncturing set P = P ∪ {m ′ } and the set of queried messages Q sig = Q sig ∪ {m}. When Z activates an uncorrupted party with input (Verify, sid, m = m ′ ..., σ, vk ′ ), G tests whether m ∈ Q sig , the signer is uncorrupted before m ′ is punctured, and Verify(vk ′ ,m,σ) = 1. If these conditions are met, then in its experiment Expt ps G (1 λ ), G outputs m ′ as the challenge string, and makes series of queries as in Definition 4. Eventually G outputs the tuple (m, σ), succeeding in the experiment.
Denote by E the event that in a run of π Σ with Z and sid = (U S , sid ′ ), the signer U S generates a public key vk, and some party U i is activated with a verification request (Verify, sid, m=m ′ ..., σ, vk), where Verify(vk, m, σ) = 1, m / ∈ Q sig , and U S is not corrupted before m ′ is punctured.
If event E does not occur, Z would not distinguish the between an ideal and a real executions. However, we are guaranteed that Z can distinguish real from ideal executions with non-negligible advantage, then event E also happens with non-negligible advantage. Note that, from the view of Z, the interaction with G looks the same as the interaction with π Σ , which means that whenever E happens, G outputs a successful forgery.
Applications in Other Proof-of-Stake Protocols
As we have described above, most existing proof-of-stake blockchain protocols are vulnerable to the LRSL attack, and we would show that our puncturable signature construction can also be applied in other Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols to resist LRSL attack. In both Ouroboros [12] and Snow White [13] protocols, each block is signed by the leader using an ordinary signature scheme and thus they cannot resist the LRSL attack. Fortunately, their signature schemes can also be replaced by the puncturable signatures directly. Specifically, in Ouroborous, the leader U i signs the block B i by σ = Sign(sk j , (sl j , d, st j )) and updates the secret key of U i by Puncture(sk j , sl j ), and the case in Snow White is similar with the exception that the slot parameter is replaced with the time step t. By this means, even if an adversary A obtains the updated secret key, he cannot sign for other block data d
′ at the same slot sl i or time step t, which furthermore avoids the forks in blockchains and LRSL attack. In addition, our puncturable signature also can be applied in Ouroboros Genesis [22] protocol similar to Section 4.1.
On tolerating a non-negligible correctness error for Proof-of-Stake Blockchain
The significant efficiency improvement of our PS construction stems partially from the relaxation of tolerating a nonnegligible correctness error, which, in turn, comes from the non-negligible false-positive probability of a Bloom filter. Specifically, the correctness error in our puncturable signature construction means that the signing of a message m may yield ⊥ even though the secret key has never been punctured at the prefix m ′ of that m. However, the correctness error can be as small as possible by adjusting the corresponding parameters in Bloom filter (see Section 2.1), which implies a trade-off between the non-negligible correctness error and the size of secret keys.
For proof-of-stake blockchain, it is a reasonable approach to accept a small, but non-negligible correctness error, in exchange for the huge efficiency gain. In fact, existent blockchain protocols achieve security properties (i.e. common prefix, chain quality and chain growth) with high probability instead of certainty, which means a small error probability is inherent in these protocols. Moreover, the signing error would not affect the running of the blockchain system. For instance, in Ouroboros [12] , the stakeholder selected as one of the leaders in current slot can still get the reward even if his signing fails. While in Ouroboros Praos [9] and Snow White [13] , some slots might have multiple slot leaders or no leader (i.e., empty slot), which means the signing error for one leader would not affect the protocol running.
Analysis and Comparison
For the proof-of-stake blockchain application, we make a comparison between our puncturable signature and two existing forward secure signatures, in terms of functionality and performance. First, puncturable signature allows each leader to generate at most one block at any slot (by puncturing at sl i , the slot number of the current block), and thus prevents attackers from compromising leaders to mount the long-range attacks. Although the forward secure signature can achieve the same functionality by using different secret key for signing in each period, their performance depends on the number of time periods T (being set in advance) or the time periods t elapsed so far, which is undesirable for the blockchain application. More specifically, in each slot of the proof-of-stake blockchain, only one stakeholder is elected as the leader to propose and sign the block, which means some stakeholders may only have a chance to sign block after long slots (i.e. time periods), however, the computational cost of one signature may be almost equal to that of multiple signatures. On the contrary, the puncturable signature can alleviate this problem because the computation is independent of time periods.
Second, keeping on the signing and verifying operation as efficient as the underlying scheme is an important goal for the forward-secure signatures as well as our puncturable signatures. However, except for [10] , almost all existing forward secure signature schemes require longer time for signing or verifying. Particularly, [20] [11] requires two ordinary verification together with several hash computations, and verification time in [21] [5] even grows linearly with the number of periods T . Apparently, our construction can retain the efficiency of the underlying scheme on signing and verifying, with k additional hash computations.
Third, the key update time of [10] [11] depends on T or t, which may bring some undesirable consumption and even become a fatal issue for some particular applications. Specifically, in the proof-of-stake blockchain, the signer may not even do any signing within one period but he has to update the signing key as long as the current period ends, which makes the update operation a vain effort. In some other applications, the signer has to update the secret key immediately after one signing operation, leading to that the number of update operations (i.e. T ) within a given validity time of the public key becomes so large that the update time is unacceptable. The key update in our puncturable signature construction is independent on T or t, and only needs k hash computations.
Finally, in Table 1 we compare the performance of our construction with that of [10] and [11] , which are most efficient in existing forward secure signature schemes. We use t h , t ′ h , t m1 , t m2 , t eT , t p , t mN , t ′ mN , t eN and t pt to denote the time for computing a universal hash, a hash for H j (j ∈ [k]) in Bloom filter, a multiplication in G 1 , a multiplication in G 2 , an exponentiation in G T , a bilinear pairing, a multiplication in Z * N , a multiplication in ϕ(N ), an exponentiation in Z * N and one primality test for one λ-bit number, respectively. We also denote |Z * p |, |Z * N | and |G 1 | as the bit-length of an element in Z * p , an element in Z * N and an element in G 1 , respectively, where p is the order of G 1 .
The implementations are written in C using version 3 Particularly, the AMCL library recommends two types of BLS curves (i.e., BLS12 and BLS24) to support bilinear pairings, and the curves have the form y 2 = x 3 + b defined over a finite field F q , with b = 15 and |q| = 383 for BLS12, while b = 19 and |q| = 479 for BLS24, where q is a prime. According to the analysis [39] , BLS12 and BLS24 curves can provide 128-bit and 192-bit security levels respectively. For the group Z * N , we choose |N | = 3072 and |N | = 7680 for 128-bit and 192-bit security levels respectively. For hash function, we choose SHA-384
2 . In addition, we assume one stakeholder can be leader for 10 3 times on average and set n = 10 3 in Bloom filter. Without loss of generality we assume the average probability that one stakeholder is selected as the leader in one slot is 1/100 (which is large enough in practice) 3 , which means there are at least 2. The hash function H j (j ∈ [k]) in bloom filter can be simulated by two hash functions according to the analysis in [40] . In practice, the guava library [41] by Google employs Murmur3 hash [42] for Bloom filter. For simplicity, we replace Murmur3 with SHA-384 during the test, however, our scheme would perform better using the faster Murmur3.
3. Note that here we just choose the specific parameters to carry out the efficiency comparison. For larger n and T , the efficiency of our scheme remains unchanged except that the time for key generation and secret size would increase according to Table 1 , and thus the advantage of our scheme over forward secure signature schemes in the aspect of sign/verify/key update time as well as signature size still holds.
10
5 slots in blockchain and set T = 10 5 . We also set the error probability pr = 1/1000 of Bloom filter, then we can compute ℓ = − n ln pr (ln 2) 2 = 1.44 × 10 4 and k = ⌈ l n ln 2⌉ = 10. Note that t in [11] denotes the time periods elapsed, also the number of signed operations so far, so we set t = 10 5 to evaluate the worst case. Table 2 summarizes the experiment results, where the time represents the average time for 100 runs of each operation and the experimental cost of each basic operation over recommended groups at different security levels is shown in Table 3 . The results show that our scheme performs better on signing and verification efficiency, significantly on key update efficiency. Moreover, our scheme has the smallest signature size, which drastically reduces the communication complexity for proof-of-stake blockchain. In addition, key generation in our scheme can be further optimized by pre-computing some exponentiations off-line. However, the initial secret key size in our scheme is large due to the Bloom filter. Fortunately, the secret key size shrinks with increasing amount of signing operations. In practice, the secret keys are stored locally on personal equipments, and reducing computation complexity and communication complexity may be more important with the rapid advance of storage technology.
CONCLUSION
Although the notion of puncturable signatures has been proposed before, this is the first work that makes it effi-cient enough to be deployed in practice. We proposed a construction approach based on Bloom filter, whose puncturing operation only involves a small number of efficient computations (e.g. hashing), which outperforms previous schemes by orders of magnitude. Next, we used puncturable signature to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocol resilient to LRSL attacks. Our motivation stems from the observation that LRSL attack can alter transactions history and furthermore hamper the development of proofof-stake blockchain. Our construction allows to realize practical blockchain protocol, and experiment results show that our scheme performs significantly on communication and computation efficiency.
How to design efficient puncturable signature without Bloom filter is a worthwhile direction. We believe that puncturable signature will find applications beyond proofof-stake blockchain protocols.
APPENDIX A REVISED OUROBOROS PRAOS PROTOCOL π ′

SPOS
In Figure 3 , we describe the revised protocol π ′ SPoS , where we replace the functionality F KES in the original π SPoS with the F PS proposed in this paper to resist LRSL attacks, and others remain unchanged.
APPENDIX B SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Given the event of violating one of common prefix, chain quality and chain growth in an execution of π ′ SPoS with access to F PS by adversary A and environment Z, we can construct an adversary A ′ so that the corresponding event happens with the same probability in an execution of π SPoS with access to F KES (c.f. Appendix C.3) by adversary A ′ and environment Z, where π SPoS is original protocol [9] . Specifically, the adversary A ′ simulates A as follows:
The protocol π ′ SPoS is run by stakeholders, initially equal to U 1 , · · · , U n interacting among themselves and with ideal functionalities F INIT , F VRF , F PS , F DSIG , H over a sequence of slots S = {sl 1 , · · · , sl r }. Define T i 2 ℓ VRF φ f (α i ) as the threshold for a stakeholder U i , where α i is the relative stake of stakeholder U i , ℓ VRF denotes the output length of F VRF , f is the active slots coefficient and ) to Z. In the next round, it sends (genblock req, sid, U i ) to F INIT , receiving (genblock, sid, S 0 , η) as the answer. If U i is initialized in the first round, it sets the local blockchain C = B 0 = (S 0 , η) and its initial internal state st = H(B 0 ). In case U i is initialized after the first round, it sets its initial state to st = H(head(C)) where C is the initial local chain provided by the environment. Chain Extension. After initialization, for every slot sl j ∈ S, every online stakeholder U i performs the following steps: 1) U i receives from the environment the transaction data d ∈ {0, 1} * to be inserted into the blockchain. 2) U i collects all valid chains received via diffusion into a set C, pruning blocks belonging to future slots and verifying that for every chain C ′ ∈ C and every block 
, sets C ′ as the new local chain and sets state st = H(head(C ′ )). 3) U i sends (EvalProve, sid, η sl j ) to F VRF , receiving (Evaluated, sid, y, π). U i checks whether it is in the slot leader set of slot sl j by checking that y < T i . If yes, it generates a new block B = (sl j , st, d, B π , σ) where st is its current state, d ∈ {0, 1} * is the transaction data, B π = (U i , y, π) and σ is a signature obtained by sending (PSign, sid, U i , (sl j , st, d, B π )) to F PS and receiving (Signature, sid, (sl j , st, d, B π ), σ). U i computes C ′ = C|B, sets C ′ as the new local chain and sets state st = H(head(C ′ )). Finally, if U i has generated a block in this step, it diffuses C ′ .
Signing Transactions. Upon receiving (sign tx, sid ′ , tx) from the environment, U i sends (Sign, sid, U i , tx) to F DSIG , receiving (Signature, sid, tx, σ). Then, U i sends (signed tx, sid ′ , tx, σ) back to the environment. • Upon receiving (KeyGen, sid, U S ) from F PS , A ′ runs as in the case of F KES for key generation, sets counter k ctr = 1 and P = ∅, and sends (PublicKey, sid, U S , v) to F PS .
• Upon receiving (Sign, sid, U S , m = m ′ · · · ) from F PS , A ′ ignores the request if m ′ ∈ P . Otherwise, it sets j = k ctr and computes the signature σ as in the case of F KES . Then A ′ updates the corresponding secret key, sets counter k ctr = j + 1 and P = P ∪ m ′ , and sends (Signature, sid, U S , m, σ) to F PS .
• Upon receiving (Verify, sid, m, σ, v ′ ) from F PS , A ′ verifies the signature as in the case of F KES , and sends (Verified, sid, m, φ) to F PS .
Note that in an execution of π ′ SPoS with access to F PS , m ′ in F PS equals sl (i.e, the slot parameter of the last block) (c.f. Definition 6), while in the execution of π SPoS with access to F KES , the input to signature algorithm is (Usign, sid, m = sl||..., sl), which means that the update of punctured set P is consistent with that of counter k ctr . In other words, when one signing happens on m containing some prefix sl, P adds sl in F PS while k ctr increases by 1 in F KES . Therefore, A ′ can simulate the execution for A. If the environment Z can distinguish a real execution with A and π ′ SPoS (accessing F PS ) from an ideal execution that provides the properties of common prefix, chain quality and chain growth, then Z can also distinguish a real execution with A ′ and π SPoS (accessing F KES ) from an ideal execution, which means that any winning advantage of the adversary against common prefix, chain quality and chain growth in π ′ SPoS with access to F PS immediately implies at least the same advantage in π SPoS with access to F KES .
APPENDIX C IDEAL FUNCTIONALITIES C.1 Ideal Functionality F INIT
In [9] , the genesis stake distribution S 0 and the nonce η (to be written in the genesis block B 0 ) are determined by the ideal functionality F INIT which we describe in Figure 5 . In addition, F INIT also incorporates the diffuse functionality which allows for adversarially-controlled delayed delivery of messages diffused among stakeholders and would be implicitly used by all parties to send messages and keep synchronized with a global clock.
C.2 Ideal Functionality F DSIG
In Figure 6 , we describe the ideal functionality F DSIG as presented in [9] , and it is shown that EUF-CMA secure signature schemes realize F DSIG in [37] . This functionality is used to model signatures on transactions in this paper. Figure 7 , we describe the ideal functionality F KES presented in [9] , where F KES is used to sign the block. Key evolving signature schemes formalize the notion of forward secure signature schemes. In forward secure signature schemes, compromise of the current secret key does not enable an adversary to forge signature pertaining to the past or rather the honest users can verify the a given signature was generated at a certain point in time, which can be guaranteed by evolving the signing key after each signature is generated and erasing the previous key in such a way that the actual signing key after for signing a message in the past cannot be recovered.
Definition 8 (Key Evolving Signature Schemes)
. A key evolving signature scheme is a quadruple of algorithms KES = (Gen, Sign, Verify, Update), where: 1) Gen(1 λ , T ) is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter λ and the total number of periods T and returns a pair (sk 1 , vk), the initial secret key and the public key;
2) Sign(m) takes as input the secret key sk j for the time period j ≤ T and a message m, outputting a signature σ j on m for period j, and the period j is encoded in the signature itself. 3) Verify(m, σ j ) is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input a public key vk, a message m and a signature σ j , outputs 1 if σ j is valid on m for time period j and 0 otherwise. 4) Update(sk j ) is a secret key update algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk j for the current period j and outputs a new secret key sk j+1 for time period j + 1.
The forward security of key evolving security is as follows:
Definition 9 (Forward Security). Formally, let the forger F = (F cma , F forge ). F cma has access to a signing oracle with adaptively chosen messages, and outputs (CM, b), where CM is the set of queried messages and b is the break-in time period. Given CM , sign(CM ) and the signing key sk b for time period b, F forge outputs (m,
A key evolving signature scheme KES is forward secure if the success probability of F is negligible in λ.
In [9] , it is shown that a construction π KES intuitively constructed from a key involving signature scheme such as [10] [11] can realize F KES .
C.4 Ideal Functionality F VRF
In Figure 8 , we describe the ideal functionality F VRF presented in [9] . This functionality is used as a private test that is executed locally to decide whether a certain participant of the protocol is eligible to issue a block. F VRF is used to capture adaptive corruptions in [9] [12] by guaranteeing that the adversary cannot predict the eligibility of a stakeholder to produce a block prior to corrupting it, thus he/she cannot gain an advantage by corrupting specific stakeholders. ℓ VRF is the function value and π VRF .sk (x) is the proof of correctness, and (iii.) Ver VRF .pk (x, y, π VRF .sk (x)) verifies that y = F VRF .sk (x) using the proof π VRF .sk (x), outputting 1 if y is valid and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we require the following properties: 1) Uniqueness: no values (VRF .pk, x, y, y ′ , π VRF .sk (x), π VRF .sk (x) ′ ) can satisfy Ver VRF .pk (x, y,π VRF .sk (x))=Ver VRF .pk (x, y ′ ,π VRF .sk (x) ′ ) = 1 when y = y ′ . 2) Provability: if (y, π VRF .sk (x)) = Prove VRF .sk (x), then we have Ver VRF .pk (x, y, π VRF .sk (x)) = 1. 3) Pseudorandomness: for any PPT adversary A, set y 0 = {0, 1} ℓ VRF , y 1 = F VRF .sk (x) and b ∈ {0, 1}, then provide y b and the Prove oracle to A, then P r[b = b ′ |b ′ ← A(y b , Prove)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ). In addition, in [9] , another property called Unpredictability is also needed to guarantee by VRF to capture stronger attacks, namely if provided with an input that has high entropy, the output of the VRF is unpredictable even when the adversary is allowed to generate the secret key and public key pair. It was shown how to realize the F VRF in the random oracle based on the 2-Hash-DH verifiable oblivious PRF construction of [43] and we omit further details here.
Definition 10 (Verifiable Random Function
Functionality F KES F KES is parameterized by the total number of signature updates T , interacting with a signer U S and stakeholder U i as follows: Key Generation. Upon receiving a message (KeyGen, sid, U S ) from a stakeholder U S , verify that sid = (U S , sid ′ ) for some sid ′ . If not, then ignore the request. Else, send (KeyGen, sid, U S ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (PublicKey, sid, U S , v) from the adversary, send (PublicKey, sid, v) to U S , record the entry (sid, U S , v) and set counter k ctr = 1. Sign and Update. Upon receiving a message (USign, sid, U S , m, j) from U S , verify that (sid, U S , v) is recorded for some sid and that k ctr ≤ j ≤ T . If not, then ignore the request. Else, set k ctr = j + 1 and send (Sign, sid, U S , m, j) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Signature, sid, U S , m, j, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry (m, j, σ, v, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to U S and halt. Else, send (Signature, sid, m, j, σ) to U S , record the entry (m, j, σ, v, 1) . Signature Verification. Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, m, j, σ, v ′ ) from some stakeholder U i do: F VRF interacts with stakeholder U 1 , ..., U n as follows: Key Generation. Upon receiving a message (KeyGen, sid) from a stakeholder U i , verify that sid = (U i , sid ′ ) for some sid ′ . If not, then ignore the request. Else, hand (KeyGen, sid, U i ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (PublicKey, sid, U i , v) from the adversary, if U i is honest, verify that v is unique, record the pair (U i , v) and return (PublicKey, sid, v) to U i . Initialize the table T (v, .) to empty. Malicious Key Generation. Upon receiving a message (KeyGen, sid, v) from S, verify that v has not being recorded before; in this case initialize table T (v, .) to empty and record the pair (S, v). VRF Evaluation. Upon receiving a message (Eval, sid, m) from U i , verify that some pair (U i , v) is recorded. If not, then ignore the request. Then, if the value T (v, m) is undefined, pick a random value y from {0, 1} ℓ VRF and set T (v, m) = (y, ∅). Then output (Evaluated, sid, y) to P , where y is such that T (v, m) = (y, S) for some S. VRF Evaluation and Proof. Upon receiving a message (EvalProve, sid, m) from U i , verify that some pair (U i , v) is recorded. If not, then ignore the request. Else, send (EvalProve, sid, U i , m) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Eval, sid, m, π) from the adversary, if value T (v, m) is undefined, verify that π is unique, pick a random value y from {0, 1} ℓ VRF and set T (v, m) = (y, {π}). Else, if T (v, m) = (y, S), set T (v, m) = (y, S ∪ {π}). In any case, output (Evaluated, sid, y, π) to U i . Malicious VRF Evaluation. Upon receiving a message (Eval, sid, v, m) from S for some v, do the following. First, if (S, v) is recorded and T (v, m) is undefined, then choose a random value y from {0, 1} ℓ VRF and set T (v, m) = (y, ∅). Then, if T (v, m) = (y, S) for some S = ∅, output (Evaluated, sid, y) to S, else ignore the request. Verification. Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, m, y, π, v ′ ) from some party P , send (Verify, sid, m, y, π, v ′ ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Verified, sid, m, y, π, v ′ ) from the adversary do:
1) If v ′ = v for some (U i , v) and the entry T (U i , m) equals (y, S) with π ∈ S, then set f = 1. Output (Verified, sid, m, y, π, f ) to P . 
